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Abstract
The Clean Water Act (CWA) has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against
both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. This article
focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of an antiregulatory arsenal now central to
battles over what are federally protected “waters of the United States.” This is the key
jurisdictional hook for CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA
contestation. The multi-decade battle over Waters protections has both drawn on emergent
antiregulatory moves and generated new weapons in this increasingly prevalent and powerful
antiregulatory arsenal. This array of antiregulatory skews and frames can be decisive,
especially when wielded before sympathetic judges skeptical about the administrative state or
environmental protection. The article questions the legitimacy of this antiregulatory arsenal,
points out ways these antiregulatory moves in the Waters setting often dodge actual statutory
choices, and identifies countervailing strategies that are more respectful of democratic choices.
The new antiregulatory canons are akin to weaponized cannons empowering judges. The article
calls for judges to apply more legislatively respectful frames in exploring questions of legal
meaning, statutes’ policy priorities, or regulatory power as allocated by Congress and wielded
by agencies based on scientific or factual criteria prioritized in governing statutes.
Introduction
The Clean Water Act (CWA) has become a centerpiece in an enduring multifront battle against
both environmental regulation and federal regulatory power in all of its settings. Looking at this
law’s track record, or particular regulations and related battles, could lead a reader to
misunderstand key drivers of waters-linked legal choice and contestation. Such contestation
over waters protection turns on far more than just what Congress wrote, or changing science, or
interest group realignments. This article focuses on the emergence, elements, and linked uses of
an antiregulatory arsenal now central to battles over what are federally protected “waters of the
United States” (hereinafter, either WOTUS or Waters). 1 This is the key jurisdictional hook for
CWA jurisdiction, and hence, logically, has become the heart of CWA contestation.
This article traces key moves and developments in this multi-decade battle over Waters
protections. As with much law, developments concerning the CWA and WOTUS both draw on
regulatory moves and countermoves, but also have themselves generated new weapons in this
increasingly prevalent and often powerful antiregulatory arsenal. This array of antiregulatory
1

Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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skews and frames can be decisive, at least when wielded before sympathetic judges skeptical
about the legitimacy or benefits of the administrative state or environmental protection. The
article closes by identifying countervailing strategies and arguing for a more democracyrespecting and science-focused approach to the issue of Waters protection and in other
environmental regulation battles. The new antiregulatory canons are now more akin to
weaponized cannons empowering judges than neutral frames or interpretive canons applied to
questions of legal meaning, policy priorities, or regulatory power as allocated by Congress and
wielded by an agency based on scientific or factual criteria set forth in statutes.

I.

A Brief Review of the Waters Question’s Statutory Roots and Early Interpretive
Stability

This Part provides a brief review of the CWA provisions at issue in Waters battles and early
approaches to that question.
The CWA extends federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution to “navigable waters,” which in
turn are defined as “the waters of the United States.”2 The “navigable waters” language was
drawn from the Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA).3 The RHA mainly regulated waterways
obstructions, but also regulated water pollution.4 In early enforcement actions and regulatory
interpretations, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Army Corps) interpreted the RHA’s Section
13 “navigable waters” language to limit their regulatory power to materials specifically impeding
navigation.5 By around 1970, as pollution concerns intensified, more expansive views of the
RHA’s protections were asserted by anti-pollution enforcers and, eventually, the Army Corps
itself.6
The statutory definition of “navigable waters” included in the CWA—“waters of the United
States”—built on RHA law, but went even further. Discussions about this 1972 amendment state
a desire to provide broader regulatory power than in the RHA.7 An early narrow Army Corps
interpretation of this CWA Waters language was judicially rejected for unduly constraining the
agency’s own power.8
2

Id. (defining “navigable waters”); at § 1251(a)(1) (stating it “is the goal that discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters by eliminated by 1985”); § 1362(12) (defining regulated “discharge of a pollutant” as meaning
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters”).
3
See supra Part II.C.iv.
4
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 435, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152. For tracing of this history, see William L.
Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972:
Part II, STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 215, 221, 259, 293-94 (2003) (tracing “navigable waters” law from the RHA to CWA); William
W. Sapp et al., From the Fields of Runnymede to the Waters of the United States: A Historical Review of the Clean
Water Act and the Term Navigable Waters, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10190 (2006) (recounting “navigable
waters” developments).
5
Andreen, supra note 252, at 221–22.
6
Id. at 258-59.
7
Id. at 280–81.
8
See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975) (rejecting “Waters” regulations
promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers as too narrow in scope); see also United States v. Ashland Oil &
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For roughly the next 45 years, all government actors, including both Democratic and Republican
administrations, embraced or at least concurred in the view that this language extended federal
jurisdiction to protect Waters as far as the Commerce Clause would allow.9 The Supreme Court
had decades earlier, in Appalachian Power, strongly affirmed that federal authority over the
nation’s waters extended beyond a mere focus on shipping-linked “navigable-in-fact” waters.
The Court stated that “[n]avigability . . . is but a part of this whole” of federal Commerce Clause
authority.10 Similarly, the Court had upheld jurisdiction over waters due to flood control
rationales.11 And further, in the more broadly significant Hodel case, the Supreme Court held
that pollution-focused regulation aimed at preventing environmental harms from commercial
activity easily surmounted challenges to federal constitutional power due to numerous facets of
commerce implicated.12 Nothing in that case focused on interstate water flows and linked
commerce as a necessary foundation for federal environmental laws. Promulgated CWA
regulations issued during the 1970s, which were only modestly adjusted thereafter, fleshed out
particular types of waters subject to federal protection, including a sweep-up provision protecting
waters used for, or subject to use for, or affecting, interstate commerce.13
As a result, both industrial dischargers and those seeking to dispose dredge or fill materials
encountered a strong CWA that disfavored filling of any Waters, plus a requirement of permits
for any industrial discharges, with ever tightening reductions in permitted discharged pollution.
But because water-edge land is of immense value for development, plus industrial polluters and
the agricultural sector claimed concerns with regulatory uncertainties and possible liability,
success in weakening the CWA’s Waters reach offered a huge economic opportunity.14

Transp’n Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (1974) (rejecting polluter arguments that oil spill into a nonnavigable tributary was
beyond federal constitutional power and outside the Act’s Waters language and antipollution mandates).
9
For discussion of this expansive intent, see Erin Ryan, Federalism, Regulatory Architecture, and the Clean Water
Rule: Seeking Consensus on the Waters of the United States, ENV’T L. 277, 285–294 (2016); William W. Sapp et
al., The Float A Boat Test: How to Use It to Advantage in This Post-Rapanos World, 38 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10439, 10442 (2008); Sapp et al., supra note 252, at 10201-06.
10
U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Pwr. Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940). For a similar conclusion regarding federal
constitutional authority over a dam on a nonnavigable stream with a goal of “control of destructive floodwaters,”
see United States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 U.S. 229, 231 (1960) (also deferring to legislative judgments
about beneficial effects on the arteries of interstate commerce).
11
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941) (upholding federal power to protect
watersheds for flood control).
12
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mng. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 275-83 (1981).
13
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206, 41250 (Nov. 13, 1986) (“1986
Rule”) (finalizing rule regulating wetlands, those adjacent to other waters, all interstate waters, and all intrastate
waters the “use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”). The Waterslinked promulgated regulation were largely stable from 1977 to 2015, and are found at 33 C.F.R. Part 328
(regulations providing “Definition of Waters of the United States”); 33 C.F.R. Part 230 (regulations setting forth
guidelines for assessing dredge or fill disposal).
14
Due to agricultural exclusions and the rarity of agricultural activities triggering all of the elements required for
being a regulated point source discharge, it remains unclear if the agricultural sector’s frequent opposition to
Waters jurisdiction is personal to that sector or part of an overall industry or Chamber of Commerce unified
weakening strategy. Concentrated feeding operations—CAFOs—are expressly subject to jurisdiction under the
CWA if polluting a jurisdictional water. See 33 U.S.C. Sec. 502(14) (defining “point source” to include
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A 1980s effort to weaken the power of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to protect waters “adjacent” to larger “navigable in fact”
waters suitable for ships, shipping, and commerce, or perhaps adjacent to a clear wetland, came
up short. The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview Homes, in 1985, unanimously agreed that
delegated, expert, science-intensive regulatory judgments about the appropriate line between
land and water were worthy of deference.15 1977 amendments, in a provision directed at state
delegated programs, had added explicit language about regulation of “adjacent wetlands,”
making the outcome easier as a statutory interpretation matter, and was central to the ruling’s
affirmation of federal power to protect the wetlands at issue.16
This ruling reflected and was consistent with the period’s low-conflict consensus about the reach
of federal power under the Constitution, the need for judicial deference to expert regulatory
judgments, and also agreement about the CWA’s reach.17 Land and water exist on a continuum,
and the CWA made protecting the country’s Waters from pollution into a national priority.
Expert regulatory judgments about where to draw the protective line were not suitable for
judicial second-guessing.

“concentrated animal feeding operation” but also exclude “agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows
from irrigated agriculture”)
15
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134 (emphasizing the science and pragmatic expert judgment involved in drawing
the line on the continuum between land and water).
16
Id at 135-39 (discussing the new language, legislative discussions, plus defeated amendments and the common
assumptions they revealed about the Act’s reach).
17
See, e.g., Hodel, supra note #, 452 U.S. at 275-93 (upholding federal power over mining harms with deference to
congressional judgments about policy and finding constitutional authority unproblematic).
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II.

Framing and Naming the Proregulatory Consensus and Emergent
Antiregulatory Arsenal in Waters Jurisdiction Disputes

Since Riverside Bayview, little has been settled. Waters jurisdiction has been under perpetual
attack, with the decisive antiregulatory Waters shift occurring in the Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County, or SWANCC, case.18 This Part first examines the preceding period of
stability about regulatory power from a broader legal perspective, then turns to the emergence of
the antiregulatory arsenal, analyzing how this arsenal has both shaped Waters battles and
emerged and been strengthened in Waters disputes.
A. The pre-SWANCC proregulatory frames
The regulatory—or perhaps proregulatory—building blocks or frames that led to three decades
of Waters stability had several key elements.
First, by the early 1940s, the Supreme Court had affirmed several elements of substantial federal
regulatory power. Most importantly, Commerce Clause authority was viewed as expansive,
including authority over waters extending beyond mere protection of interstate shipping.19 For
decades, congressional judgments that there were constitutionally sufficient commerce links
were close to unreviewable. 20 This was partly due to a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, but
also linked to United States growth as an integrated, vibrant, center of commerce with people,
goods, and production’s benefits and harms all pervasively crossing state borders.21
As confirmed in the foundational cases like Wickard v. Filburn and Hodel, even seemingly small
and localized activities and resulting effects linked to statutory protections provided commerce
linkages justifying federal jurisdiction.22 Gonzalez v. Raich confirmed, or at least clarified, that
adequate commerce links were assessed at the programmatic, aggregate level; seemingly smallscale regulatory interventions or fights were not lost from federal jurisdiction just because they,
on their own, were small.23
Second, and similarly, statutory savings clauses, floor preemption provisions, and cooperative
delegated program federalism designs were used in most environmental and other risk regulation
laws.24 Hence, Congress politically sorted out the federalism-linked choices, setting

18

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (hereinafter SWANCC).
See supra notes # to # and accompanying text (introducing Appalachian Power and other early major cases
about waters and federal power).
20
See generally Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism, Power and Perspective in
Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1199 (2003) (tracing and critiquing changing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and shift from deferential review to closer more skeptical views).
21
Id.
22
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal power to regulate home-grown wheat due to
commercial ripple effects of such conduct); Hodel, supra.
23
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005); see id. at 37 (Scalia, J. concurring).
24
See generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction,
82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1547 (2007) (presenting and analyzing forms of federal and state power allocations in federal law,
19
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foundational minimum federal requirements, but also welcoming state cooperative efforts and
state choices to do more.25 Such designs did not trigger any major backlash in politics or the
courts. The Supreme Court in several major environmental law decisions carefully traced what
was federal and what statutes left to state judgment, declining to redraw those lines.26 As a result,
expansive federal power tended to overlap and intertwine with state and local regulation. Earlier
constitutional “dual federalism” views that federal and state power were mutually exclusive were
jettisoned. Concurrence, not mutual exclusion, became the federal norm.27
Third, the seriousness of environmental degradation and ripple effects of pollution for years
triggered in Congress a strong majority legislative consensus and bipartisan commitment. For
example, although President Nixon vetoed the modern CWA 1972 Act, Congress resoundingly
overrode that veto.28 That legislative consensus was, with only occasional judicial roadbumps,
met with a sympathetic judicial reception. If laws were expansive and protective, they would be
enforced and interpreted fairly, with courts expressly deferring to the political branches’
policymaking primacy.29
Not only were environmental laws read sympathetically, but agencies’ implementation and
enforcement actions, if undertaken in good faith, tended to receive deferential judicial review.
Law interpretations were met with deference, especially after the Chevron case announced the
“Chevron Two-Step.”30 That case actually involved a policy shift to embrace market-mimicking
forms of environmental regulation to reduce costs, but its usually deferential framework had
broader implications. It provided latitude for agencies to adjust their policies to address new risks
or embrace better means to address risks.
Likewise, key Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedents framed most environmental cases as
implicating congressional judgments about allocations of work to expert agencies that were not

with focus on implications of federal regulatory floors and ceilings); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1996) (discussing federalism rationales and designs for environmental laws).
25

For explorations of rationales for, and benefits of, federal plus retained state power in the climate regulation
setting, see William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 2017 Wisc. L. Rev.
1037 (2017). For a citation to literature discussing climate federalism rationales, see id. at 1040-42 at notes 4 and
5.
26
Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (tracing Clean Air Act’s divisions and declining to find federal
power to second-guess state planning choices complying with federal requirements); International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (in case centered on which state’s law governed claims regarding common law
pollution harms, carefully reviewing savings clauses to preserve pollution source state’s common law and more
stringent regulation alongside federal water pollution regulation).
27
Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism, Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1216-19 (2003) (reviewing multiple and often overlapping ways federal
regulation was found constitutional after 1937).
28
Sapp, supra note #.
29
See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 65-69 (8th ed. 2019) (reviewing periods of
environmental law and discussing consensus period of bipartisan legislative support and judicial acceptance of
those policy choices).
30
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 487 U.S. 837 (1984).
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up for judicial second-guessing.31 Congress, agencies, and reviewing courts generally agreed—
as reflected in the Riverside Bayview Homes Waters case reviewed above-- that agencies in the
risk regulation and environmental realms were working in areas of specialized expertise
involving scientific, ecological, public health, and technological assessments; agency expertise
far surpassed that of generalist courts.32 This was a key underpinning of Chevron, but also a
major rationale for deference in many cases from before and after Chevron.33 Major precedents
discuss the laws’ goals, what Congress or agencies found about the environmental concerns,
underlying science, and effectiveness of responsive measures, but with little skeptical judicial
parsing or stingy reading of statutory language.34
During this period, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, courts actually often skewed in favor of
regulatory protections and power, sometimes even chastising agencies that failed to do the
protective work mandated by statutes.35 This was especially evident in early appellate cases
under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), where the D.C. Circuit rejected grudging
formalistic compliance with that law’s requirements that agencies assess the environmental
effects of their actions.36
Lastly, statutory interpretation norms applied to the wave of post-1960s environmental laws were
pluralistic, with courts tending to look at laws, underlying legislative history, and the judicial
role through a sympathetic and sometimes purposive lens.37 Courts often adopted a partner role,
31

For a classic statement of such attitudes, see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, # (1978) (declining calls to narrowly read
the Endangered Species Act because “it is . . . emphatically . . . the exclusive province of Congress not only to
formulate legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for
the nation”).
32
For discussion of role of expertise in judicial review of agency actions, see Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to
Understand Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1097, 1099
(2015) (analyzing facets of agency regulatory expertise and their link to judicial deference rationales).
33
Prior to Chevron, the two most significant opinions about the nature of and rationales for judicial deference to
agencies were Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 140 (1944) (explaining why agency views about law and
facts deserve “respect,” deference, and “in some cases decisive weight” since agency will have “more specialized
experience”); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944) (stating that “it is not the court’s function to
substitute its own inferences of fact for the [NLRB’s]” because “Congress entrusted” to NLRB such determinations).
34
See, e.g., Hodel, supra note # (identifying congressional goals and rationales for mining regulation and finding
them both constitutional and worthy of judicial deference).
35
For an influential early such opinion, see Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)
(rejecting FPC failure to assess natural resource implications of a project and stating the agency could not “act as
an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it . . . [but] has an affirmative duty to
inquire into and consider all relevant facts”).
36
See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc, v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-15 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (stating that with NEPA’s enactment, the AEC “is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental
values into account” and that its “procedural duties . . . must be fulfilled to the fullest extent possible”). The
Supreme Court has, when reviewing actions under NEPA, repeatedly in recent years moved to narrow the power
of the law, plus Congress has added NEPA carveouts in numerous statutes. See Glicksman, et al, supra note #, at
251-59, 279 (discussing exemptions and exclusions). For analysis of NEPA’s track record in the courts, see David
Adelman and Robert Glicksman, Presidential Politics and Judicial Review, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 (2018).
37
This was true across regulatory fields. With the rise of textualism, especially in the forms championed by Justice
Antonin Scalia, many judges and courts shifted to a more parsimonious or stingy approach that looked at words in
isolation, often with little attention to their goals and purposes. For general discussion, from the perspective of a
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seeking to work with agencies and Congress to ensure laws were not derailed or rendered
ineffective. Especially in the environmental law realm, judicial “resistance norms” or skews
against congressional or agency power were virtually nonexistent.38

B. The antiregulatory arsenal begins to emerge
All of that started to change, however, with the strategic, sequential development of the
increasingly prevalent, mutually reinforcing set of frames or moves that this article focuses on
and refers to as the antiregulatory arsenal. The article now turns to that emergence by tracing
those shifts as both influencing and emergent in Waters jurisprudence, with occasional
integration of linked supportive developments and other major cases.39
The antiregulatory arsenal is, basically, a near complete reversal of the sympathetic valence of
the proregulatory consensus period sketched above. It has several elements that are explored
below: Constitutional frames have shifted, with federalism a prevalent scale tipper or barrier to
federal environmental power, but often through avoidance canons. Deferential judicial review to
delegated, expert agency judgments has given way to judicial embrace of claims of federal
overreach and even growing presumptions against federal power. Judicial reluctance to secondguess agency scientific and other data-driven judgments has given way to minimal concern with
where actual science or data points. Selective or exaggerated claims of hardship or a sole focus
on concerns of those regulated often become the heart of challengers’ claims and Supreme Court
responses. This has been true even in reviewing regulatory actions with millions of lives at
risk.40
And, lastly, the rise of textualism, especially in its more microtextual forms, has become a major
facet of moves to judicially trim statutory reach and agency powers.
1. The federalism revival and clear statement skews
The Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival became central to arguments and actions unsettling this
bipartisan political consensus over Waters protection. After decades of deferential judicial
review upholding federal laws under the Commerce Clause, a decisive shift occurred in the
supporter of textualism, see John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70
(2006). For criticism of textualism and discussion of statutory interpretation methodology shaping or contesting
the antiregulatory arsenal, see infra at Parts #.
38

See infra at notes # for discussion of antiregulatory shifts, especially with the major questions doctrine.
For a larger historical legal review of the decades long push to weaken the administrative state through an array
of concerted strategies, some of which are analyzed in this article see THOMAS MCGARITY, FREEDOM TO HARM: THE
LASTING LEGACY OF THE LAISSEZ FAIRE REVIVAL (2013).
40
For a recent example, see National Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Dept. of Labor, --S. Ct.—(Jan. 13, 2022) (NFIB)
(striking down Occupational Safety and Health Administration COVID-19 regulation of larger employers requiring
worker vaccination or testing as beyond the agency’s power, with focus on concerns and burdens on those
opposed to vaccination, but no discussion of effects of power rejection on workers left at greater risk).
39
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1990s. After United States v. Lopez upheld a challenge to congressional power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate guns near schools, attacks on expansive federal environmental
laws suddenly had new legal material to leverage and provided a double opportunity.41 Given the
commercial nature of most polluting activities, commercial uses of Waters, plus massive costs
linked to harms to Waters, a direct challenge to Commerce Clause-based authority for
environmental laws would be a long shot.
However, laws could perhaps be weakened or shrunken through constitutionally weighted “clear
statement” arguments that would trim environmental laws’ scope under the guise of
constitutional avoidance efforts, especially focused on impingements on state turf. In addition,
efforts to challenge the reach of environmental laws, rather than complete attacks on their
validity, might further shift and expand upon these new limitations on federal Commerce
power.42 Basically, the constitutional shifts made in Lopez and the later Morrison case, which
struck down portions of the Violence Against Women Act, created opportunities for shrinking
both federal statutory and constitutional power.43 This opportunity was seized and the law
transformed in 2001.
2. SWANCC’s destabilizing ruling
The recasting of Waters law took its most significant shift when the Army Corps asserted
jurisdiction over abandoned Midwestern water-filled gravel pits slated for municipal landfilling.
The site fell into a category called “isolated waters.” The Army Corps rationale for protecting
that particular site included reference to migratory bird use of the pits.44 An earlier Federal
Register discussion-- which was not a promulgated regulation, but nonetheless referred to as the
“Migratory Bird Rule”-- identified migratory bird use of putative Waters as a potential grounds
for federal Waters jurisdiction.45 Although the statutory term “navigable” is defined with the
broader “waters of the United States” phrase, challengers to federal power nonetheless sought to
revive the defined term “navigable” as a rationale to deny or limit federal jurisdiction.46
Challengers also were pushing against regulatory, Supreme Court, and lower court rulings that
said the definition of “navigable waters” provided jurisdiction broader than a navigability focus
on use by large scale ships, barges, and the like.47
In SWANCC, the Supreme Court embraced these new power-shrinking arguments and, partly due
to its sketchy and mostly unexplained conclusions, launched the revamping of Waters law.48 The
Court revived “navigable” as power-limiting language.49 Drawing on the Court’s own federalism
41

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Brief for the Petitioner at 15–21, 36–45, Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (hereinafter SWANCC).
43
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
44
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162 (2001); Brief for the Federal Respondents at 8, SWANCC.
45
1986 Rule, supra note 258, at 41250–51.
46
Brief for Petitioner at 16–19, SWANCC.
47
See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 n.6 (1987) ; United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 132-34 (1985); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp 685, 686 (D.C.C. 1975).
48
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171–172.
49
Id. at 172–173.
42
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revival, the Court stated the Army Corps was acting at the outer bounds of federal authority, but
without a congressional clear statement authorizing the particular power assertion at issue.50 The
word “navigable” still mattered despite its definition; the Court stated the statute did not provide
a clear enough statement to authorize jurisdiction over the isolated waters at issue. The Court
also saw the jurisdictional assertion as a problematic incursion on states’ usual land use
regulation primacy, plus drew on a statutory savings clause’s references to state “primary” roles
and “land use” authority, but otherwise left its constitutional concern unexplained.51
This claim that the action was at the boundaries of federal power was crucial to SWANCC, but
upon examination remains hard to fathom. It was contrary to longstanding views of the CWA
and other environmental laws and abundant Commerce Clause jurisprudence; the regulatory
action at issue seemingly passed muster in numerous ways. The water-filled pits were created by
past commercial use, migratory birds’ cross-state movements and linked commerce had long
been a basis for federal jurisdiction, and the site’s proposed new municipal landfilling was rife
with direct commerce links and commerce effects.52 And the size of the particular disputed
Water was not grounds for a loss of jurisdiction. As mentioned above, and as subsequently
reaffirmed in Gonzales v. Raich had long been the law, Commerce Clause analysis does not
excise from federal jurisdiction individual seemingly small-scale applications of overall
regulatory schemes that satisfy Commerce linkages.53 Furthermore, all anti-pollution laws
overlap with state and local land use, pollution regulation, and states’ broad police powers, but
preceding Supreme Court precedents did not see this as a problem.54
And while savings clauses, like those in the CWA, preserve room for complementary state roles
or greater stringency, as do cooperative federalism provisions, here the actions at issue were
within a strongly federalizing law with numerous federalism-linked provisions.55 The CWA
clearly went well beyond state laws’ protections and created a new antipollution norm, unless the
polluting activity was federally permitted. The CWA was not a crude law that swamped state
authority or was of uncertain preemptive effect. The CWA made very particular choices about
federal requirements and left abundant room for additional state action. Its preservation of state
50

Id.
Id.
52
Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1227 (2003) (questioning Court assertion of agency action at the bounds of
federal power).
53
See supra notes # and accompanying text.
54
Hodel, supra note #, 452 U.S. at 275-93 (upholding federal regulation of private mining polluting activity despite
mix of preemptive provisions, cooperative federalism options, plus areas of overlap).
55
Savings clauses are several, each with a different focus. The CWA “purpose” provision embraces states’ ongoing
“primary” pollution control roles, land use primacy, and preserves their authority to “prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). State common law regimes and right to enact more stringent laws are
expressly preserved. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(e), 1370. Likewise, state primacy over water allocations is preserved. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(g). Several provisions also allow states to constrain federal actions or federally permitted actions.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (providing state certification process linked to water quality obligations for federally licensed
or permitted actions). Section 404 similarly contains its own dredge or fill-specific savings clause that can constrain
federal activities. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(t). Section 313 requires federal land and facilities managers to comply with state
water-quality protections. 33 U.S.C. § 1323.
51
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power did not actually anywhere state limitations on federal power. Instead, the law’s provisions
reflected an embrace of mutual, overlapping, substantial protective powers of the federal
government and the states. The statute’s language had a strongly protective valence, allowing
states to do more, but never do less.56
The clear statement move, linked here to the constitutional avoidance canon, was not a new
move, but as applied in SWANCC was odd.57 At its most basic, the constitutional avoidance
canon arises when a constitutional question could be part of a controversy, but that controversy
could be resolved without a new binding or partial declaration of constitutional law.58 Under the
logic of this avoidance canon, courts should not dive in and create new constitutional lines, but
avoid new constitutional declarations. On the other hand, in most settings where it had been
applied prior to SWANCC, the constitutional concern was clear, even if the Supreme Court or
lower courts avoided an authoritative resolution. In SWANCC, however, it was hard to see how
there was any concern at all. The preemptive provisions and savings clauses created no
constitutional issue, and commerce linkages of several kinds clearly existed. Regulatory overlap
of federal and state law was by then a commonplace and had not presented constitutional issues
for decades.59 Nonetheless, consistent with criticisms that “clear statement” moves create a
judge-empowering means to rewrite laws, the SWANCC Court nonetheless cited the
constitutional avoidance canon, then alluded to unspecified federalism concerns, and then used
that rationale to narrow the statute’s regulatory reach.60
The SWANCC Court’s use of a “clear statement” plus federalism move did not just tip the scale
for the case. SWANCC created a powerful new precedent for challengers, in large part due to its
odd and also unspecified application.61 If these vague, mostly illogical, concerns were enough,
then SWANCC could be artillery to challenge federal power without actually explaining the
constitutional problem; turf overlap might suffice, and turf overlap pervades environmental
laws.62 Or, as in SWANCC, even a strongly federalizing law could, if accompanied by common
savings clause language, become suitable for judicial trimming. In addition, all antipollution and
natural resource-protecting laws overlap with state and local land use roles, yet that overlap here,
combined with the savings clause, was claimed to further justify the SWANCC Court’s unsettling
of Waters law. These challenger and antiregulatory court moves could be cloaked in language of
jurisprudential modesty, yet rewrite a law’s reach and jettison precedents: Congress simply had
56

Close parsing of CWA federalism provisions is infra at notes # and accompanying text.
For a classic analysis of the logic and problems with clear statement moves, see William Eskridge and Philip
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
For further analysis and citations, see infra at notes # and accompanying text.
58
Id.
59
See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note #, at (analyzing SWANCC within analysis of shifting Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
60
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-74.
61
See Matthew B. Baumgartner, SWANCC’s Clear Statement: A Delimitation of Congress’s Commerce Clause
Authority to Regulate Water Pollution, MICH. L. REV. 2137, 2145–49 (2005); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, VANDERBILT L. REV.
592 (1992) (discussing the usage of clear statement rules pre-SWANCC).
62
See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010) (criticizing uses
of “clear statement” moves if not linked to constitutional choices reflected in its text).
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not conferred authority with adequate clarity.63 These interwoven strategies seized in SWANCC
both reflected changing trends in the law and created powerful legal shifts due to their
combination of breadth and indeterminacy.
Also notable in SWANCC was judicial inattention to underlying science and economics of the
disputed waters. Instead, the Court focused on the word “navigable” as its linchpin. It did not
limit protection only to Waters plied by shipping; that previously established law extending
jurisdiction beyond large, ship-sized and used Waters remained.64 Nonetheless, “navigable” was
given a meaning that, in the Court’s ruling, precluded federal protection for isolated waters.
Despite the CWA’s provisions focused on “chemical, physical, and biological integrity,” and
provisions expressly focused on aquatic ecosystem protection against pollution and filling, the
Court put those express goals to the side in favor of a shipping-lite focus on this one word,
“navigable.”65 This case did not otherwise rely heavily on the textualist toolchest. Nonetheless,
as explored further below, this sort of focus on a single word, with neglect of consequences of
that read and undercutting of statutory protections, was consistent with an emerging strain of
textualist methodology.66
Likewise, the case lacked language of deference to expert regulatory judgments, despite the
Riverside Bayview Court’s unanimous view that the waters-land jurisdictional line was one for
expert agency application and deserved deference.67 Instead, the SWANCC Court said it “would
not extend Chevron deference” due to the unspecified federalism and Commerce Clause
concerns.68
Chevron deference, however, centers on agency language interpretation latitude, not issues of
deference to science, technical, or other empirical judgments. SWANCC nevertheless also did not
mention or engage on the question of deference to the agencies’ expert scientific judgments
about why such Waters, under the Act, were worthy of deference. Analysis of power, stated
constitutional concerns, and analysis of statutory language and inferences from regulatory history
seemed to crowd out respect for expert agency scientific judgments delegated to agencies under
the Act. Scientific judgments by agencies required by the Act were supplanted by the SWANCC
majority justices’ focus on a few words, with no analysis of the effects of their own redrawing of
the statute’s protective lines. The same language, and somewhat similar Waters questions, were
at issue in both Riverside Bayview Homes and then SWANCC, but the Supreme Court majority’s
attitudes had dramatically changed.

63

See also infra at Part III.D.iv (discussing deference regimes and major questions doctrine’s link to clear statement
moves).
64
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-71 (stating that conclusion but declining “next step”);
65
These many other provisions and textual indicators that the CWA was not focused on navigability, but protecting
Waters for the functions and integrity, is address infra at notes # and accompanying text.
66
See infra at notes # to # (analyzing counterarguments based on provisions the Court neglected).
67
Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131-35.
68
531 U.S. at 172-73.
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3. Rapanos and its many questions
In the Rapanos litigation--another case about the reach of the CWA--new opportunities presented
by SWANCC, the federalism revival, and growing use of antiregulatory skewing were further
exploited and fiercely contested.69 Rapanos, as well as its included companion case, Carabell,
again involved disputes over how to deal with Waters that in some respect were “adjacent” or
linked to larger waters that no one disputed were federally jurisdictional. The challengers saw
Rapanos as a vehicle to extend Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and “clear statement” claims as well,
possibly weakening the CWA and federal power more broadly.70 If victorious, more waterside
land could be developed and pollution discharged with impunity.71 Opponents also sought to
build on yet another new regulatory crosscurrent, namely weakening of decades of deference to
agency law interpretations under the Chevron case, an emergent anti-deference trend that
SWANCC had helped get rolling.72
Supporters of waters protection raised counterarguments and wielded different frames and
methodologies. Pro-environmental interests and dozens of states emphasized the stable,
bipartisan nature of CWA Waters protections.73 They argued that Riverside Bayview Homes
largely ruled as a precedent due to substantial overlap in the particular Waters-land borders at
issue.74 Defenders highlighted strong commerce linkages in the actual facts of case before the
Court. Even the Bush administration—a generally antiregulatory administration—called for
retention of longstanding views of federal CWA power.75
The resulting 4-1-4 Court Rapanos split left confusion in its wake, but then resulted in a period
of consensus about how it should be read in its applied precedential impacts. No single majority
opinion spoke for the Court, although numerical majorities joining certain elements was apparent
(and expressly stated). Different opinions addressed the array of statutory, constitutional, and
precedent-based claims.76
Justice Scalia, speaking only for a plurality in his opinion’s limiting language, drew on his “new
textualism” toolchest. He mostly ignored legislative history, then dismissed decades of
administration and court views about Waters authority, viewing them as reflecting “entrenched
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There were 65 briefs and amici filed in the Rapanos legislation. For discussion, see Felicity Barringer, Reach of
Clean Water Act Is at Issue in 2 Supreme Court Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A8.
70
Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 12–17, Rapanos v. United States of America, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (No. 04-1034)
(hereinafter Rapanos).
71
Brief for the National Association of Home Builders as Amicus Curiae in support of petitioners at 5–6, Rapanos.
72
Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 4–6, Rapanos; Brief of The Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
17–19, Rapanos.
73
Brief of Former EPA Administrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4–7, 26–21, Rapanos.
[Disclosure—the author of this article was a co-author of this brief.]
74
Brief for the United States, Rapanos.
75
Id.
76
Rapanos.
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executive error” and overreach.77 Science and systematic assessment of effects were not
addressed. For him, it was a question of clear language, with a heavy weighting (it appeared) of
concern with regulatory excess. He sought to establish such claimed excess through citations to
and sketches of past litigated cases resulting in court decisions. He did not consider broader
regulatory costs and benefits, agency track records overall (whether litigated or not), or
adjudicatory records or rulemaking materials about Waters protected, relevant science, and
effects of various uses and Waters harms. The selection bias risks of looking only at challenges
to regulatory power as proving systemic regulatory overreach were obvious and basic, but that
risk was ignored in favor of the rhetorical punch such examples provided.78 But the logic
weakness of relying on cases alleging regulatory overreach as establishing a pervasive problem
of overreach should have been apparent, acknowledged, and perhaps explained away (if
possible).
Instead, after his anecdotal documentation of claimed overreach, Justice Scalia’s plurality
opinion focused on dictionary definitions of “water” or “waters,” the use of “the” before
“waters,” the “waters” relationship to permits required for “point sources,” and a brief foray into
federalism to reject agency deference and the claim of agency jurisdiction.79 Calling his view the
“natural,” “common sense” and even the “only plausible” reading, he advocated a brand new,
unprecedented limiting read.80 His plurality opinion asserted that the CWA only protected
permanently flowing, continuously connected waters.81
This novel limiting read of the statute was utterly without precedent in any phase of the CWA’s
history. In its effects--were it a majority opinion-- it would have radically curtailed the Act’s
reach. It would have newly removed from federal protection most of the arid West and
Southwest, where hot and dry conditions often leave riverbeds and other water-linked features
dry. That the Scalia plurality’s conclusions would provide a federal green light for pollution of
waters where they are an essential and particularly rare and precious resource was given no
attention. In such settings, they would be least protected. In fact, Scalia said nothing about the
consequences of his interpretation, apart from criticizing the dissenters as offering a “policyladen” conclusion that would (in his view) let the Army Corps “regulate the entire country as
waters.”82 This claim of pervasive federal overreach was again unsupported by any record basis
in his opinion, citation, or underlying materials.
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Id. at 722-29 (Scalia, J., plurality op.)(asserting “immense expansion of federal regulation of land use”); at 752
(making “error” point).
78
For explanation of selection bias, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 5.16 (2008) (stating
that “[s]election bias refers to a sample being drawn in a way that makes it unrepresentative of the population to
which inferences are to be made”). For discussion of the problem of selection bias in assessing deference regimes
and their effects, see William N. Eskridge & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment
of Agency Statutory Interpretation from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1122-23 (2008).
79
Rapanos at 735-38.
80
Id. at 730-35, 739.
81
Id. at 739.
82
Id. at 746-47.
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Justice Kennedy’s swing vote opinion—the 1 in the 4-1-4 split-- which focused on what he
called “significant nexus” waters that were assessed for their connections and functions, was
mostly embraced by the four dissenters.83 His test largely tracked factors and criteria in the
statute, as long utilized in promulgated Waters regulations, and also applied in adjudicatory
judgments about Waters. He still called for judicial affirmation that an adequate “significant
nexus” existed. The dissenters agreed with protecting both Kennedy’s waters and the small but
sometimes different waters protected by the Scalia plurality. As the dissenters stated, this meant
a five-justice majority agreed with protecting Kennedy “significant nexus” waters, and eight
justices agreed with also protecting the more limited but different sorts of waters protected under
Scalia’s opinion.84 A clear majority rejected the Scalia plurality jurisdiction-limiting language.
The dissenters would have deferred to the underlying regulatory judgments, but expressed
agreement with Kennedy about the sorts of variables and protective goals that should inform
questions about Waters jurisdiction.
4. Post-Rapanos regulatory vacillation to Sackett
Between 2015 and 2021, the Waters battles shifted to agencies and the courts. The Obama
administration by rule in 2015 sought to restore Waters protections based substantially on a
“connectivity” study of all peer reviewed science regarding Waters’ functions.85 That was met
with a cascade of challenges, echoing the claims and artillery wielded in SWANCC and Rapanos.
The Obama Clean Waters Rule also sought to offer both some simplified distance-based lines
about what was protected and also make clearer several express carveouts from jurisdiction.
Those regulatory judgments were also challenged, with a challenger public relations campaign
claiming the regulation would reach puddles and tiny ditches, and calling for regulators, courts,
or legislators to “ditch the rule.”86 The Obama regulation was stayed by the 6th Circuit, although
the Supreme Court subsequently held that the rule was not subject to that court’s direct review.87
The Trump administration, in a series of reversal actions, built heavily on the plurality opinion in
Rapanos by Justice Scalia to argue that they legally had to shelve the Obama Clean Waters
Rule.88 In an unusual regulatory twist, but one used in several other major Trump administration
actions, the agencies claimed that they were compelled to adopt this deregulatory view that, in
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Id. at 759-87 (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment); 787-812 (dissenting opinions).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 808-09 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (explaining
how Court majorities voted to protect both “significant nexus” waters and the less protective but differently
framed plurality waters).
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Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States”, 80 Fed. Reg. 37053 (June 29, 2015) (Final Rule).
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See Buzbee, The Tethered President, supra note # at 1382-83 & note 117 (discussing and citing sources
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National Ass’n of Mfrs v. Department of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 627, 634 (2018).
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this instance, ran contrary to over 40 years of executive branch views of the CWA.89 They
basically ignored the plurality nature of the Scalia opinion, majority rejection of its limitations,
and contrary majority support for the waters protected under the Kennedy opinion.90 That
Trump agency action, in turn, led to its own judicial challenges and several rejections.91 After
President Joseph Biden assumed control of the White House in 2021, his EPA and Army Corps
started the process to issue a new Waters regulation that differed from both preceding
administrations.92
Litigation and regulatory actions in the meantime continued, with EPA and the Army Corps
approaching Waters jurisdiction issues through adjudicatory judgments and under longstanding
regulations, as they had after Rapanos, but before either the Obama or Trump regulations.
One of those adjudicatory actions led to an early 2022 Supreme Court challenge from a 9th
Circuit ruling. In Sackett v. EPA, in response to pleas from antiregulatory interests about
regulatory confusion, overreach, and need for clarity, the Supreme Court voted to wade yet again
into the Waters question. The challengers’ arguments were basically the entire antiregulatory
arsenal rolled into one set of largely echo-chamber briefs.93
The Sackett certiorari grant was unusual: A strong lower court consensus existed on waters
protected; the regulatory approach by EPA, the Corps, and DOJ in adjudicatory judgments had
long been held legal; and with a regulatory proposal midstream, there was a transitional moment
in agency interpretations.94 The particular enforcement setting underlying the challenge
appeared to be resolved. The challenges raised in Sackett, however, again built on the same
mutually reinforcing set of antiregulatory frames.
The Court’s framed petition grant question was itself puzzling, skewed to a judge-empowering
answer. It may have reflected a legal error and also failure to understand the science-intensive
nature of jurisdictional determinations. The Court’s question stated: “Whether the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 9th Circuit set forth the proper test for determining whether wetlands are "waters
of the United States" under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1362(7).” The puzzler is that
the lower court had no choice but to study Supreme Court opinions and obey what it perceived as
binding precedent. The Supreme Court, however, undoubtedly has power to revisit and clarify,
89

For analysis of this unusual “statutory abnegation” strategy of the Trump administration, where agencies newly
claimed to completely lack power previously asserted, see William W. Buzbee, Statutory Abnegation in the
Deregulatory Playbook, 68 DUKE L. J. 1509 (2019).
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See supra notes # and accompanying text (reviewing the Rapanos case opinion alignments).
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See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Regan, No. 20-cv-602, 2021 WL 4430466, at *5 (D.N.M,Sept. 27, 2021); Pasqua Yaqui
Tribe v. U.S. EPA, ___ (D. Arizona Aug. 30, 2021) (finding regulation built on Scalia plurality and resulting massive
loss of federal protection to be contrary to the statute and arbitrary and capricious).
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so a more logical question would focus on the question itself, under the Act’s language. Second,
the Court framed the question as though only wetlands are at issue, yet the question of what are
jurisdictional Waters is the linchpin of the whole statute.95 Petitioners, and those seeking to
shrink the Act’s protection and perhaps federal Commerce Clause power, have long tried to
shine their attacking lights on wetlands, given their (by definition) less river-like nature. No one
could know if the Court took the bait, or really planned confine its ruling just to wetlands
protections and federal power.96
Lastly, the question as framed in Sackett seemed to be calling for a single test, yet the United
States is vast and contains innumerable types of waters, geographic attributes, different
underlying science, and water functions. No single brief “test” can be created, unless the Court
plans to disregard the Act’s own quite specific sexpress goals, criteria for protection, decades of
rulemakings and underlying regulatory materials, congressionally devised procedures and
requirements to determine what is a protected water, effects of those varied possible regulatory
choices, and then applying those factors and procedures to what pollutant dischargers hope to do.
The resulting mix of Rapanos, SWANCC, the earlier Brown & Williamson decision have, as a
line of precedent, subsequently been harnessed in frequent calls for “clear statement”
presumptions against federal power and against deference to agency power claims in other major
regulatory battles.97 Along with the earlier Commerce Clause revival precedents, these cases
together create linkable anti-regulatory gambits.
The article now breaks out these key antiregulatory moves in very brief form, first showing how
they have been used in Waters battles and with brief reference to other battles, such as those over
climate regulation and COVID-linked requirements. It then in the closing Part critiques them for
their lack of democratic legitimacy and disrespect for the empirical expert judgments allocated to
agencies, and explores countervailing strategies.
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43 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 15, at 5 (Sept. 5, 1979) (calling Waters jurisdiction the “linchpin” of the statute that should
be applied through a “single judgment” regardless of the type of polluting activity at issue).
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In merits briefing, Petitioners in Sackett sought to expand the question framed by the Court. See Petitioners’
Reply Brief, Sackett (July 8, 2022).
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See e.g. Opening Brief of Petitioners on Core Legal Issues, at 36–41, West Virginia v. U.S. E.P.A. (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21,
2016) (No. 15-1363) (emphasizing such arguments in challenge to the Obama administration Clean Power
Plan).
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III.

The Antiregulatory Arsenal, Distilled

The Waters battles are hence not an isolated body of legal tumult, but reflect and contribute to a
growing antiregulatory jurisprudence. This brief part breaks out the shifts identified above,
identifies other settings they will likely be used, but also reflects on their ubiquitous, powerful,
and largely legally unmoored nature. Examples from recent briefs, mostly from the Sackett case,
are provided as examples.
A. Anti-federal skewing and deference lost
These antiregulatory moves, in their collective impact, end up strongly working against any
federal regulation with national reach. Indeed, that may be their very reason for existence.
Federalism under our nation’s Constitution is a two-edged sword, with congressional choices
about federalism allocations often wielded with nuance and reflecting varied choices about
federal and state roles. That federal law is supreme and potentially preemptive is part of the
Constitution’s federalism design. Agencies have long been the vehicle for carrying out federal
law, with deference regimes central to their regulatory implementation adjustments and
judgments.
In the antiregulatory arsenal, however, states are viewed as needing protection; assertions of
federal regulatory power are met with pushback.98 That laws tend to embrace a mix of
preemptive regulatory floors, some carveouts from federal power, savings clauses that range
from the general to quite specific, and then cooperative delegated program federalism options,
does not seem to matter. Likewise, the norm of federal and state overlap and intertwined
authority is viewed not as a welcome attribute, but a problematic bug.
Likewise, claims that the breadth of federal power is suspect is itself problematic since, by its
very nature, federal regulation is meant to have a national reach. States are often given latitude
to devise compliant plans, usually under cooperative delegated program structures, but nationally
uniform requirements are the norm and often a key rationale for federal environmental and other
risk-reducing laws.99
A shift is underway from routine application of Chevron deference. Although that case involved
a major policy change in regulation affecting almost every factory in the country, it is now often
ignored or declared inapplicable due to the breadth of the action’s claimed effects.100 Advocates
and courts sometimes leave it unmentioned.
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See Brief of Amici Curiae State of West Virginia and 25 Other States in Support of Petitioners, Sackett, supra,
(passim) (emphasizing alleged federal overreach and impingement on state turf) .
99
See Esty, supra note # (reviewing rationales for federal environmental regulation).
100
See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners (April 18, 2022), Sackett,
supra (arguing against deference to agencies and for judicial resolution but without mention of Chevron)
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Especially now with the Roberts Court, the antiregulatory majority now often adopts antideference or even “clear statement” demands and “major questions” presumptions against
federal power. The 2022 West Virginia climate regulation case, which rejected EPA’s power
despite a strong textual and factual justification for the Clean Power Plan’s (CPP’s) “generation
shifting” strategy, will likely now be the quintessential antiregulatory arsenal citation and
example.101 A key starting move by the Court was the claim that CPP’s strategy was
extraordinary and had huge political and economic effects. 102 This was questionable, if not
clearly controverted by regulatory materials. Actual regulatory materials published by the Trump
administration compared its own deregulatory policy weakening to the effects of the CPP’s
“generation shifting”-based pollution reduction goals. The CPP had been stayed by the Supreme
Court and never came into effect. Nonetheless, as the Trump administration’s analysis found,
emissions reduction targets of the CPP had been exceeded by business shifts even though the
regulation never came into effect.103 The Trump administration’s rollback action would have
made no difference.104 Basically, the CPP was actually neither ambitious nor disruptive. Inaction
exceeded its mandated reductions. Nonetheless, the majority opinion rested almost entirely on
the Court’s choice to subject the challenged agency action to the “major questions doctrine’s”
skeptical, usually fatal, scrutiny due to such claimed major effects.105
These are all major shifts in presumptions. Breadth of language and power are now rationales for
limiting federal agencies’ power, rather than grounds for supporting and deferring to their
actions.106
B. Anecdotal tales of overreach
In cases cutting back on federal regulatory power or seeking such outcomes, both antiregulatory
advocates and aligned judges and justices often go well beyond the actions presented to claim
much broader overreach or abuses of regulatory power.107 In each new case, earlier case
language about overreach is then quoted as establishing the fact of broader problems or
abuses.108 Other reported cases are cited as establishing much broader and contestable claims
101
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about inappropriate action. Rarely in these cases do advocates or judges painstakingly establish
from actual regulatory materials that these claims are accurate. Since cases get to the courts after
rulemakings or adjudicatory actions, and usually where a combination of both create a
substantial regulatory record about regulatory programs’ effects or factors, often applied in more
context-specific settings in adjudicatory settings (whether enforcement actions or permit
evaluations), finding such documentation is possible. Relatedly, regulatory impact analyses
assessing the costs and benefits of regulatory actions often themselves contain support or
refutation of claims of illogical or egregious regulatory overreach later asserted.109 They too
nonetheless are rarely cited.
Also notable is that tales of agency overreach or abuse are rarely leavened with analysis of the
extent to which underlying statutes, in their protective policies, explain or even require the
actions under attack. Nor is analysis of benefits of a regulatory scheme provided; the focus is on
burdens.110
C. Microtextualist moves and erratic attention to context
The last, but perhaps most important, common element in the antiregulatory arsenal is changing
statutory interpretation methodology. Methodology that consistently and with thoroughness
involves parsing of the major environmental laws’ texts and their operative logic would probably
tilt in a protective direction. After all, environmental laws tend to be quite express about their
antipollution, environmental and health-focused protective goals and decisional criteria, who is
to play what roles, and through what procedures. The antiregulatory arsenal, however, tends to
rely on decontextualized microtextual analysis. Advocates and sympathetic judges look at a few
words in isolation, often with inattention to larger context or surrounding illuminating provisions
or how a statute works or even its express statements of goals, purpose, or findings.111
Sometimes, advocates or antiregulatory judges seem to engage in “textual gerrymandering,”
where the texts they choose and others they ignore or downplay appear strategically chosen to
favor their desired outcome.112 Findings and purpose provisions are derided as not reflecting
operative terms’ more particular bargains. Digging further into legislative history or other
historical context and legislative evidence is largely condemned; those sources of illumination,
with their usual explanation of why and how a statutory provision works, tend to be written to
make clear what a statute or provisions is meant to do. When excluded from analysis, they are
109
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not there to check contrary conclusions drawn from isolated statutory words or frequently
referenced (but themselves sometimes cherry picked) dictionary provisions.
But other cases will at times rely heavily on larger structural inferences, or even claims about
problematic consequences of particular statutory reads.113 To the extent textualism’s main claim
is that it is neutral and constrains judges from pursuing their preferred policy ends, erratic levels
of focus and methodological heterogeneity actually empower judges with many ways to reach
their preferred ends. As Professor Gluck has argued, this methodological heterogeneity and
erratic applications of the textualist toolchest undercut claims it is a formalist, predictable, and
constraining school of interpretation.114
Similarly, and related to the shift away from deference regimes mentioned above, advocates or
judges focusing on a few words to reach agency-disempowering conclusions tend to avert their
gaze from larger complexities in how laws and regulations actually work.115 Agencies do heavily
weigh such real-world complexities; they live with their regulatory programs and statutes every
day, hearing from those regulated and protected how their regulatory regimes and actions work
or fall short.116 Agencies also are often major players in drafting statutes and, of course, develop
understanding over the years how statutes and their many linked provisions and programs
interact.117 Were courts to put those different levels of agency versus court expertise onto the
scale, it would tip power back to agencies. Instead, words are decontextualized from
surrounding words, from analysis of regulatory interactions, with little or no analysis of
documented effects of outcome choices. The result is a weakening or even elimination of
deference to agency judgments and insensitivity to how a regulatory program actually works.
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IV.

Political Branch Primacy and Responses to the Antiregulatory Arsenal

The antiregulatory arsenal is powerful. With a 6-justice antiregulatory majority now ensconced
in 2022 on the Supreme Court, it is also unlikely to fade in the near future. This closing Part
analyzes doctrinal counters and strategies that might nonetheless check aggressive reliance on
this arsenal. Some success with these strategies might, over time, shift doctrine or at least case
outcomes in ways more respectful of political branch choices and statutory primacy.
Notably, new legislative or regulatory actions are no guarantee of success. After all, the
antiregulatory arsenal moves are judicially created scale tippers that at times give little attention
to the actual statutory choices, skeptically assess regulation, and embrace anecdotes and
assertions over attention to actual data, science or regulatory materials.
Nonetheless, if legal doctrine as judicially established in court precedents, and not raw political
power, remains relevant—and this is concededly a question-- then regulatory actions are more
likely to survive judicial review when Congress, agencies, or advocates do the following:
--rigorously provide or engage with statutory criteria, context, structure, and congressional
choices about actors’ roles;
--carefully engage with science and other evidence made relevant under the statute;
--present and challenge evidence before agencies, forcing agencies (to the extent possible) to
collect and assess those stakeholder contentions and materials and, hence, focus later reviewing
courts on resulting findings that have an actual record basis and that were tested through quasidemocratic and often adjudicated deliberative regulatory procedures.
With stronger statutory, regulatory, and procedural analysis and factual vetting, advocate and
judicial reliance on the antiregulatory arsenal will be more difficult and likely tempered with
attention to legislative choices, science, and other effects analysis made relevant under statutory
criteria.
A. Statutory interpretation and drafting counters
The antiregulatory arsenal tends to be cloaked in claimed respect for statutory choices and,
frequently, power shrinking interpretive choices made in light of asserted inadequate statutory
“clear statements” authorizing disputed regulatory powers.118 Language is often
decontextualized and recharacterized, with champions of antiregulatory ends tending to shun
much other than isolated snippets of language.119 Picking up on Justice Scalia’s multidecade
attack on uses and abuses of legislative history, antiregulatory judges and advocates also tend to
shun interpretive cues that might be gleaned from legislative evidence generated during the
legislative enactment process. Since legislators tend to talk about legislation to persuade other
legislators, the president, and the public, such legislative evidence typically focuses on a law’s
118
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goals and public-regarding rationales.120 Later advocate or judicial refusal to consider such
evidence predictably will reduce the body of material that might point in a protective
direction.121 These methodological shifts, however, do not render wholly futile efforts to draft
legislation with clarity or rigorously work with statutes’ actual words and choices.
1. Statutory language clarity
Statutory drafting clarity about regulatory goals, criteria, process, and actors is, of course, the
most effective counter to power challenges. The clearer Congress is in making choices that are
memorialized in the statute’s text, the more constrained will be all subsequent players working
with that statute.122
However, broadly empowering statutes as enacted during the early to mid-20th century, with
short but highly discretionary conferrals of authority, now create risks of judicial resistance. For
example, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, or the National Environmental Policy Act, and
perhaps some of the federal lands-regulating or resource extracting statutes with broad language
or difficult balancing exercises, are unlikely to be given a liberal protective read. The Supreme
Court’s NFIB Covid-19 decision rejecting the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s
authority to enact a “vaccine or test” policy for workplaces provides a near template for checking
any pathbreaking or unusual, or especially novel and onerous, regulatory actions under statutes
empowering agencies with broad language.123 The Court’s per curiam opinion emphasized not
those imperiled by COVID in the workplace as well as their families and community, but instead
called the vaccine policy “a significant encroachment into the lives—and health—of a vast
number of employees.” It expected a “Congress to speak clearly”—really more clearly—to find
such power authorized.124 The power was not “plainly authorized.”125 The breadth of the risk,
and that it was encountered both in and out of the workplace, was fatal: “That kind of universal
risk” could not justify OSHA’s action because it would “permit[] OSHA to regulate the hazards
120
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of daily life.”126 Only if “particular features” of a workplace made the “virus pose[] a special
danger” might OSHA be able to act.127 Hence, in NFIB, and in the antiregulatory arsenal, broad
conferral of powers, or possibly even broad undefined language within otherwise detailed
statutes, may be met with judicial resistance in the form of a “clarity tax,” in the words of Dean
John Manning.128
Environmental laws, in their key modern framework versions enacted since the late 1960s, tend
to have far more clearly delineated goals, operational sections, federalism choices, and
definitional clauses than such earlier, short, broadly worded statutes. Because text is at least
stated as given primacy by all judges today, rigorously linking those actual textual choices
remains an advocate’s most powerful tool. Environmental laws’ intertwined choices and
textually evident logic, if highlighted, might ameliorate or check arguments rooted in narrowing
reads.
But maybe not. In the 2022 West Virginia case, the Court conceded the statute’s key terms could
justify the “generation shifting” strategy embraced by the Obama administration, but found the
terms too “oblique,” an “empty vessel,” and in too much of a “backwater” provision to justify
EPA’s policy.129
Given this symposium issue’s focus on the CWA at 50, this article turns primarily to examples
drawn from the CWA and also Waters contestation, including questions and contentions in the
major precedents and as framed in Sackett (which was pending when this article was written).
2. “Waters of the United States” as a statutory methodology puzzle
The ongoing battles over what is a federally protected jurisdictional “navigable water” has, at its
roots, a statutory interpretation question. Contestation is traceable to that term’s seemingly
circular definition of “the waters of the United States.” But this definition is clearly an expansion
from a mere focus on navigability. The CWA is undoubtedly broader in its antipollution reach
than the Rivers and Harbors Act, which did have a primary navigability focus and secondary,
later developed antipollution reach.130 Scholarship and legislative history of the CWA both
confirm what the textual addition itself reveals; federal jurisdiction was made more expansive.131
Still, leaving unanswered in the statute’s text itself the question of which “waters” were reached
with this expansion was unfortunate. Were the jurisdictional linchpin of the law made clearer,
space for antiregulatory arsenal salvos would be substantially diminished. The statute,
nonetheless, provides far more material that, in its actual texts, structure, and operational
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mandates and logic, counters—and should have long ago countered—arguments and court
opinions skewed against the heart and logic of the CWA.
A prime example of how textual analytical rigor can be powerful to counter the antiregulatory
arsenal is provided by again parsing of the Supreme Court’s choice of the question for Sackett:
what should the “proper test” be for jurisdiction over “wetlands” under the CWA? Right off the
bat, the Court’s question revealed statutory and programmatic ignorance, error, or statutory
disregard at several levels. Effective responses are challenging due to a Catch-22 choice: CWA
Waters are the jurisdictional hook for virtually all of the key operative antipollution provisions in
the statute. This includes industrial pollution discharges from pipes and other point sources, oil
spills, and dredge or fill disposal permits that are often the main permitting affecting wetlands.
(Wetlands also can also be tainted with effluent discharges from industrial point source
discharges regulated under Section 402 or be dumping ground for oil; wetlands protections and
rationales are not coextensive with Section 404 reach questions.)
Those trying to protect the Act’s longstanding reach in Sackett were thus confronted with a
strategically tough decision in responding to the Court’s framing of the question presented. They
had to decide whether to emphasize the broader importance of Waters jurisdiction question, and
hence risk broadening the implications of a resulting decision, or take the Court’s word choice
seriously and simply focus on wetlands and how and when they should be protected as CWA
Waters. Such a narrower focus, however, could also lead to inattention to surrounding
provisions that shed light on permissible or best statutory meanings. In addition, the Court’s
framed question seemed to be implicitly assuming that it is for the Court to craft such a test.
This too is wrong, for reasons now explained.
Most important to check antiregulatory derailments via judicial power grabs are four sorts of
statutory text-based sources of meaning illumination, as illuminated through this CWA Sackett
analysis.
First, if Congress chose to include express statements of purpose, whether in their own findings
and purpose provisions, that textual commitment should be emphasized. Similarly, when a law’s
operative provisions through their operative logic, functions, and decisional criteria reveal their
protective design, that should be central to later advocate, agency, and judicial choices about
meaning. Express statements of purpose are far different from judges intuiting a purpose or goal
and then expanding on it.132 So, for example, with Waters questions, the CWA’s opening
provision emphasizes its integrity goals, namely that the statute is meant to protect the nation’s
Waters’ “chemical, physical, and biological integrity.”133
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Similarly, and with greater detail, numerous provisions spell out various water quality goals with
environmental, health, and recreation-focused criteria guiding all regulatory actions. All of them
focus on preventing water pollution and filling of waters unless permitted. The jurisdictional
language, in which “navigable waters” is given its broad definition of “the waters of the United
States,” is just that—a statement of statutory jurisdictional breadth, not a statement of the
statute’s goals or criteria for assessing a water’s status. Other provisions confirm both what the
statute is aimed at doing and also refute claims it is focused on navigational commerce or only
channels of commerce, as the Petitioners in Sackett argued.
The relationship of “waters” protections criteria and navigation is actually made clear in two
provisions that mention “navigation,” but within provisions with dozens of express
environmental, health, and recreational criteria that must guide regulators in categorizing waters
and deciding whether to permit pollution. After specifying these environmental criteria,
antipollution policies, and antifill presumptions, Section 404 adds regulators can “additionally”
take into account “navigation and anchorage” concerns. 134 The Act’s water quality provisions
similarly state that navigation is a secondary “consideration.” 135 This linguistic nuance reveals
that navigation is a concern, but clearly secondary to the antipollution and environmental
integrity goals and linked analysis of waters’ functions and protection of water quality.
Second, some textualists deride purpose or goals language even when it is expressly put into the
enacted law, emphasizing that a statute’s operative provisions are what really matter and reflect
actual choices and tradeoffs. Operative provisions that require particular actions, especially those
that spell out criteria for regulatory action, are indeed central and must be engaged. There too,
however, the CWA is even more clear about its focus as revealed by what it mandates and
criteria it sets forth to guide agency actions. In numerous provisions, the CWA is expressly about
constraining or stopping pollution, requiring permits for any polluting activity (except some
nonpoint and agricultural carveouts), in stating an express no-discharge aspiration. In its design,
the CWA steadily tightens levels of pollution control over time and requires heightened pollution
controls for new pollution sources, toxics discharges, or if water quality remains impaired after
technology-based effluent limitations are imposed.136
In addition to its antipollution focus, the CWA repeatedly makes clear the “why” of such
prohibitions and provides criteria for regulatory judgments. As shown in the next few
paragraphs, the Act’s express criteria focus on protecting Waters’ ecosystem, recreation, health,
and human functions. It is not a law about navigation, nor is it a law about land use regulation.
The CWA is about protecting the environment from polluting activities that affect Waters
resources for the services and functions they provide.
For example, and of especial importance to the Court’s Sackett question framing, Section 404
contains language about its environmental aims, its anti-fill tilt, and is laden with environmental
criteria. This focus on waters functions and water quality, as well as health, fisheries, and
134
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recreational goals, is expressly stated in part of Section 404, but especially in Section 404’s
incorporation by reference for all dredge or fill disposal permits of the presumptions and criteria
stated in Section 403(c) for constraining ocean discharges. Apart from the “additionally”
language referenced above, none of these provisions are about navigation. Section 404
regulatory choices must comply with mandated “guidelines” to be crafted by EPA, in
“conjunction” with the Army Corps, that prioritize “effect[s] of disposal on human health or
welfare, including . . . plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shorelines, and beaches.”137 They must
consider “effect[s] of disposal” including effects on “ecosystem diversity, productivity, and
stability; and species and community population changes.”138 It further calls for consideration of
“esthetic, recreation and economic values,” thus expressly requiring attention to the commercial
effects of Waters protection or failures of such protection.139 It also calls for alternatives to such
disposal, especially “land-based alternatives.”140 Note also that because the term “wildlife” is in
addition to specified “fish” and “shellfish,” under antisurplusage interpretive norms coupled with
dictionary definitions, this language choice supports an argument that the statute’s protective
reach focuses beyond species swimming in the water or in soils beneath or within the water.141
These environmental, ecological, and biological goals are further reified in EPA’s Section 404(c)
veto provision. This provision empowers EPA to object to—to veto, in environmental
practitioner parlance-- a proposed or Army Corps granted dredge or fill disposal permit if “it will
have unacceptable adverse effects on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds, and fishery areas
(including spawning, and breeding areas), wildlife or recreational areas.”142 Again, the law
focuses on the environment and Waters’ functions.
In addition, the 1977 Act amendments expressly made clear for the first time that “wetlands” are
protected, while subject to possible state programmatic assumption under a delegated or
cooperative federalism program structure. Under this provision, the Corps and EPA would retain
their powers over “wetlands adjacent” to transportation and foreign commerce-linked types of
waters.143 If this were all that the CWA reached, then the delegation option under Section 404
would delegate nothing regarding wetlands. The language implies that state delegated primacy
under federal law reaches waters that are not themselves directly used for commerce or
navigation or adjacent wetlands. Again, close textual analysis both reveals tenable or best
meanings, but also can refute other advocated meanings.144
Third, also relevant to curtailing the antiregulatory arsenal is close attention to the who and how
of each statute. Advocates, agencies, and judges must all respect the allocations of authority and
137

Section 403(c).
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
The first definition in most dictionaries, such as the Oxford English dictionary, lists “animals, insects, and birds,”
with no express reference to water-based species.
142
Section 404(c).
143
Section 404(g)(1)
144
See Eskridge & Nourse, supra note # at # (discussing how attention to larger language clusters will illuminate
both tenable meanings and often preclude others).
138

27

what delegated actors must do with that authority. In the CWA, no major task is handed to
federal judges. The CWA is not a law like early securities or antitrust laws that, by design, were
drafted to allow agencies, government lawyers, and then courts to develop a body of statutedriven regulatory common law, crafting protective policies through the courts on a judicially
written case-by-case basis. Instead, the CWA makes express choices about the key federal
agencies and also roles of the states. Hence, Section 404’s cross reference to 403(c) is express
that EPA’s “Administrator” is to be the crafter of implementing guidelines, working with the
Army Corps. EPA must make scientifically driven, environmentally protective judgments based
on these lengthy, detailed criteria about when Section 404 dredge or fill disposal permits may be
granted.145 Other than later express references to other actors, EPA is expressly delegated overall
primacy to “administer this chapter.”146 EPA also retains its Section 404(c) veto power when
environmental degradation concerns are serious.147 The Army Corps is given the key role in
making initial Section 404 permit choices based on site-specific, science-based judgments,
subject to consultation rights of EPA, other agencies that might have concerns, and state and
local preserved authority.148 Congress hence chose the key expert actors; courts are not among
them apart from subsequent judicial review roles.
Related, antiregulatory moves often seek to put a heavy thumb (or foot) on the scale under the
auspices of federalism concerns to protect state roles and, sometimes concomitantly, limit the
federal domain. Statutes like the CWA, however, make very particular and often subtle choices
about the mix of federal and state roles. Little is left to surmise, if a statute is given a “fair” and
careful reading, as the Roberts Supreme Court has now called for in several major cases.149 The
overarching reality is that the CWA of 1972 was a massive new federal statute setting forth new
goals, priorities, and limitations, with antipollution and integrity goals made express, paramount,
and repeatedly stated.150 The 1977 amendments strengthened its reach, especially to protect
wetlands.151
Furthermore, the Act’s Section 404 policies and prohibitions were uniform national mandates.
Similarly, the whole logic of Section 402 NPDES permits was to require nationally uniform
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levels of pollution control by industrial categories, linked to the pollutant at issue.152 Permits had
to draw on EPA-created regulations that provided such information by category. As evident in
the statute, in legislative history, in court decisions, and in scholarship, the statute’s logic was to
enact uniform national policy that would prevent a destructive environmental “race to the
bottom” among the states.153 Decades ago, the Supreme Court identified such categorical
regulation as necessary to serve the CWA’s goal of “national uniformity.”154 But as with other
federal laws, effective achievement of ambitious national environmental aims requires additional
state and local efforts, if aligned or more protective, and also benefits from site-proximate work
by states offered delegated program roles. Critically important are savings clauses that allow
states to do more, while other sections make clear that certain turfs remain for the states—
namely, riparian water governance and other forms of allocation of quantities of waters, nuisance
liability, and possible more stringent state regulatory requirements.155
The CWA, like other federal environmental laws, thus sets federal regulatory floors, allowing
states to do more. Federal approvals do not limit state and local governments’ authority to say
“no” or further tailor when, where, and how polluting conduct make occur. Federal law does not
supplant state and local land use planning.156 Hence, and importantly, federal permits do not
guarantee or require a state or local government to agree about that pollution source’s location,
rights to operate, or levels of pollution allowed, provided state regulation is “no less stringent”
than federal requirements. States simply cannot try to authorize something prohibited or
embrace laxity if the conduct is subject to particular forms of constraint under federal law,
regulations, or permits.157
Fourth, procedural choices further illuminate actors and criteria for regulatory actions. Federal
CWA permitting—including both industrial discharge permitting under Section 402 and Section
404 dredge or fill disposal permitting, as well as EPA’s veto provision—are themselves subject
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to specified notice and comment procedures. These procedures provide opportunities for input
and objections by all players concerned with water pollution permitting. Such disputes can range
from Section 404 questions about the nature and function of categories of water, a particular
site’s waters, the magnitude of risks and whether they would justify an EPA Section 404(c) veto,
or a polluter’s status which can influence permitting stringency under Section 402 NPDES
permitting, or possible eligibility for “nationwide” general permits that authorize types of actions
by category. Both permit stakeholders and regulators must, in those settings, engage actual facts
and science. This also includes Section 401 state rights to shape federal activities that would
cause pollution and possibly impair state water quality.158 The water quality and Total
Maximum Daily Load backstop program further sets a national priority that, even beyond
uniform federal permits, requires polluters and states to do more if water quality remains
impaired.159
No stakeholder can sit out these many delineated congressionally devised procedures, fail to
introduce arguments and evidence or disputed contentions, then later in the courts rely on
conjecture. Courts, similarly, under long established doctrine should, in all but limited irregular
settings, respect these congressional choices of venues for evidentiary contestation, regulatory
modes specified, and only draw on materials contained in the “whole record” before the
agency.160
This attention to express goals, statutory criteria, operational logic, assigned actors and process,
and a record thereby created, highlights the atextual and cherry-picked nature of elements of the
SWANCC and Rapanos decisions. In SWANCC, the somewhat abrupt key majority paragraph
penned by Chief Justice Rehnquist gives substantial weight to navigability as a concern that
required emphasis even with the far broader definition Congress provided. Attention to virtually
all other statutory provisions discussed above reveals the law to be about limiting pollution,
constraining and prohibiting discharges, and with a focus on environmental and ecological
functions of waters, and overlapping “integrity” goals. Only by weighting navigability and
ignoring other express provisions and operational reach and logic could this SWANCC language
seem at all tenable.
Likewise, the SWANCC majority cherry-picked one federalism provision—the savings provision
preserving state “primary responsibility” over pollution, but then skewed its reading to preserve
state land use regulatory authority not to fulfill federal CWA goals, but as a rationale to limit
federal power. This was an atextual move that failed to look at the language in context of the
many federalism choices. Complementary and overlapping federal and state roles, with the
CWA overall creating a new protective superstructure of national requirements that neither states
nor polluters could dodge, went unmentioned. The SWANCC majority replaced the actual
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statutory reticulated choices and decades of rulemakings and adjudicatory proceedings with the
judicial view that federal regulation unduly impinged on state interests and had to be limited in
the absence of a “clear statement.” No record was cited in support of this critically important
empirical assertion. The Court basically rejected the federalism balance struck by Congress in
the statute.
Similarly, both the Scalia plurality opinion and Kennedy concurring “significant nexus” opinion
in Rapanos also can be criticized when measured against the CWA’s many intertwined and
reinforcing provisions, although with the Scalia opinion far more clashing. Nothing in the CWA
supports the heavy weight Scalia places on surface connection and permanent flow. It simply is
not there, nor does it logically follow when assessed against the Section 403(c) criteria that set
forth the Section 404 rationales and basis for permitting guidelines. They focus on water quality,
functions of waters, fisheries protection, health, and recreation. The Scalia plurality’s
microtextual, decontextualizing focus on the “the” and “waters,” plus dictionaries, is inattentive
to the CWA’s actual larger statutory context, structure, express goals, or national uniformity
goals.
Indeed, in its operational logic and inevitable consequences, the Scalia plurality—were it a
majority view—would necessarily eliminate from national protection many if not most types of
Waters features found in the United States west, southwest, and hotter, drier portions of
California.161 It also might render unprotected flood-prone areas of the country that rely
extensively on levees or settings where wetlands that are sometimes blocked by natural berms
that are episodically both built up and breached during major storm events. The Federal
Respondents in Sackett highlighted this levee example as a reason to reject the Scalia plurality
test or similar tests advocated in the case.162
Paradoxically, in the states where water is most scarce and precious, the Scalia approach would
have eliminated the CWA’s applicability over dredge or fill disposal activity, industrial pollution
discharges, and oil and spill regulation and protections. Water features critical to recharging
aquifers and carrying rare but heavy rains downstream in clearly evident riverbeds to larger
rivers like the Colorado River would, it appears, be excluded. This sort of unequal and
geographic exclusion is flatly contrary to national uniformity and protective design of the CWA
that is expressly required throughout its hundreds of pages.163 Nothing anywhere in the statute,
its legislative history, science, or scholarly analysis, supports a new judicial carveout of Waters
in the arid west and southwest or in the southeast where levees and berms block continuous
water connections.
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Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” concurrence, which in its protective logic and
explanations about protective waters was agreed with in the four dissenters’ opinion penned by
Justice Stevens, was partly consistent with the CWA viewed through an integrated functional
lens, but partly atextual in others.164 The explanations for when and why “significant nexus”
waters deserved protection largely tracked the Section 404 and 403 (c) criteria, the Act’s water
quality-focused provisions, longstanding regulations, and decades of adjudicatory actions and the
policies they reflected and further created. Kennedy looked at the functions of waters and linked
features and how their protections would further the statute’s expressly stated goals and criteria.
He noted that sometimes Waters are of especial value precisely due to their being blocked from
other Waters.165 For this reason, the four dissenters agreed with protecting such “significant
nexus” waters.166
On the other hand, the statute clearly assigns to EPA and Army Corps primacy for making such
judgments based on science and the protective goals stated in the law, both in regulations and
then through specified procedures in programmatic delegations and in deciding on particular
permits. By creating a new test putting generalist judges in the critical oversight role, Justice
Kennedy was disregarding the contrary choices of Congress. The dissenters disagreed with this
element of the Kennedy opinion.
Petitioners’ briefing in Sackett further made a sort of stealth huge attack on the CWA’s reach that
similarly, upon close examination, ran counter to the statute’s express reach and procedural
choices. The petitioners and allies made central to their arguments that CWA jurisdiction—in
their conclusory but unsupported views—is obviously severed if a human constructed road or
homes stand between an alleged Water and an indisputably jurisdictional Water.167 It is true that
Waters can lose their jurisdictional status if permitted activity changes them, if natural processes
change their nature, or if the Army Corps confirms something is no longer a water.168 But that is

164

The Rapanos dissenters agreed with protecting “significant nexus” waters, creating a numerical majority.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 808-09 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (explaining
how Court majorities voted to protect both “significant nexus” waters and the less protective but differently
framed plurality waters)
165
The Kennedy concurrence focuses on the functions of wetlands waters, especially the ways wetlands “filter and
purify” water and reduce pollution flows, harms, and flooding, sometimes even due to “the absence of an
interchange of waters.” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 775-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
166

The Rapanos dissenters agreed with protecting “significant nexus” waters, creating a numerical majority.
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (explaining how
Court majorities voted to protect both “significant nexus” waters and the less protective but differently framed
plurality waters).
167

Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 4, 8, 50, 52, Sackett v. U.S., __S. Ct. (No. 21-454) (April 2022) (arguing that
due to road and homes blocking Sackett site from Priest Lake, the site lacks an allegedly required surface-water
connection” and therefore “EPA has no basis” to regulate the site)
168
Permits allowing fill can render them nonjurisdictional. Regulations state than “[c]hanges” in a water’s
jurisdictional status can occur due to natural processes. 40 C.F.R. § 328.5. “Man-made” changes, however, can only
alter jurisdictional lines after Army Corps “examin[ation]” and “verif[ication].” Id. For further analysis contesting

32

it. Nothing in the statute or longstanding understandings confirm this much repeated claim of
Petitioners and amici allies.
This stealth attack claiming that human barriers obviously sever federal jurisdiction, which is
unsupported with evidence about the effects of such a policy, or any underlying regulatory
record support, or caselaw, ran counter to five decades of contrary views of all administrations
and courts. In fact, this longstanding and statutorily grounded policy was never challenged in the
ways required by the CWA and Administrative Procedure Act.
The Sacketts basically needed to make this argument because this was the physical setting of
their disputed property and building plans. But for a road and some houses, they were much like
the site found jurisdictional in Riverside Bayview Homes, or arguably more clearly jurisdictional
giving documented “shallow subsurface flow” connecting the site, a tributary, and a large
jurisdictional lake.169 Justice Scalia’s plurality similarly argued that breaks in surface connection
would eliminate jurisdiction. He too did not grapple with contrary statutory language, contrary
enduring regulatory policy, or the implications of such a view if it meant that, across the nation,
human constructed interruptions would eliminate federal protections. Much as the Supreme
Court in Maui understood and prohibited clever efforts to destroy protection through several
strategic steps or manipulation of engineering design, close analysis provides strong arguments
against the petitioners’ unbriefed but oft-mentioned astonishment that blocked Waters could ever
be jurisdictional.170
The flaws with this contention that human constructed blockages destroy jurisdiction are
highlighted by analysis of the statute’s choices and linked effects. Again, microtextual
antiregulatory moves are subject to effective counters that engage more of the disputed statutory
provision’s statutory context. First, the whole design of the CWA regulates human activity that,
through pollution discharges or dredged or fill material disposal activities, impair or destroy
waters. Allowing a tributary, wetland, or edge of a major river or coastline to lose protections
due to linked or earlier human construction or pollution would, in effect, gut the act.
Several provisions quite specifically address and preclude this move to sever CWA jurisdiction
due to human constructed barriers. Most important is Section 404(f)(2), which creates a major
exclusion to a long listing of exemptions from Section 404 strictures. Even “incidental
discharges” linked to efforts to “bring[] an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was
not previously subject,” and where “flow or circulation might be impaired or the reach of such
waters be reduced” remains subject to Section 404’s permit criteria and requirements: it “shall
be required to have a permit under this section.”171 Due to this provision and Section 403(c)’s
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criteria, regulations have likewise long precluded construction methods, impoundments, berms,
roads and the like from destroying jurisdiction.172
Importantly, those longstanding regulations and the statutory provision on which they rest
basically mean the following: apart from natural processes that destroy a water or regulatory
actions approving a status shift (such as a permit), once something is a Water, it usually remains
a Water even if humans somehow seek to change or destroy it.173
These longstanding regulations were not challenged in Sackett. Were they to be challenged,
stakeholders and regulators would have had to apply the science and statutory criteria, then
assess the effects of any such change on a national basis against the Act’s ubiquitous protective,
environmentally focused goals. Any national policy shift from current promulgated Code of
Federal Regulations requirements and prohibition would have to engage fully with the past
record, the past rationales for protections, decades of experience and effects under the still
effective regulation, and empirical assessment of the effects of any redrawing of regulatory lines.
It would also have to comport fully with the Court’s rigorous fact-intensive analysis required for
agency policy changes.174 Decades of regulatory experience under this policy would need to be
engaged, effects of both old policies and new policies assessed and compared, and a new flatly
contrary policy justified as a matter of fact and law.
B. Regulatory effects complexity counters
The second major counter to the antiregulatory arsenal’s elements still must draw heavily on
rigorous, holistic, statutory analysis, but turns in a different direction. Instead of focusing on
enacted statutory texts to check cherry-picked textual claims and freewheeling sorts of policy
revision, the focus is on the science, business, and fact side of regulatory choosing. All statutes,
especially environmental laws, include goals and establish criteria that must be engaged in any
regulatory action. Agencies, stakeholders, and later reviewing courts must engage with
“contingent facts” that statutory criteria and procedures choose.175 Especially prevalent in
environmental laws are benchmarking forms of regulation that set limits or mandates based on
what the “best” in some comparator category can achieve.176 Courts asked to make major
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regulatory policy revisions should be overtly presented with the same avalanche of empirical
complexities that make any agency regulation, especially agency policy change, a challenge.
Although antiregulatory advocates and judges often present the world through a simplistic lens
focused on burdens on targets of regulation, or sometimes a focus only on the business side of
the regulatory ledger, such a one-sided focus can never be legally justified. All laws state
protective goals, with their focus often on preserving or enhancing the value of the thing
protected. Economic effects, costs, or other ripple effects must be analyzed as well. The Supreme
Court’s Michigan v. EPA decision also creates a default requirement of consideration of both
regulatory benefits and associated costs of any regulatory action, unless shaped or precluded by
statutory language.177 No agency could legally ignore statutory criteria and evidence about
regulatory choices’ effect in a thorough balanced way; agencies must supply such balanced,
statutorily respectful analysis. Courts tempted to engage in skewed, one-sided concerns about
effects should similarly be challenged (or subject to polite entreaties) as well.
To reach the sympathies of antiregulatory courts and direct their attention to statutorily relevant
criteria and effects, advocates may need to emphasize costs borne by other business, state and
local governments, and other tangible monetizable stakes and harms. What is a cost, benefit, or
new burden depends on the valence of the action. Whether an action strengthens or weakens
regulatory requirements, costs and benefits of the shift will be apparent and must be assessed
unless precluded by statute. Environmental laws may not, as written, be skewed to favor business
concerns, but if the effort is to awaken politically biased or partisan judges to congressional
choices and all relevant effects, attention to such effects concerns may be essential.
For example, in the recent West Virginia case, power companies crafted just such arguments in
support of EPA’s regulatory power.178 And although the Supreme Court trimmed EPA’s power
and the CAA’s reach in its far-reaching opinion, the Court was responsive to the power
companies’ argument. The companies sought to protect longstanding industry practices and
investments and, it appears, feared a Supreme Court opinion that would unsettle their regulatory
and business arrangements. As alluded to above, the case focused on EPA’s power to set
emissions caps for power plant greenhouse gas emissions by taking into account all of the ways
–inside and outside “the fenceline” of power plants --such emitters actually reduce emissions
while they also juggle business factors and environmental obligations under local, state, regional,
and federal environmental and energy laws.179 This baseline analysis frame is crucial under the
CAA’s relevant provision because pollution limits must be based on levels achievable by the
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“best system of emission reduction” that is “adequately demonstrated.”180 The power companies
focused on such contingent facts in aligning themselves with EPA’s position, pleading with
justices evidently hostile to EPA’s power not to unsettle their business environment. The
companies emphasized the challenge of crafting cost-effective compliance strategies and their
constant adjusting of parameters as part of running their businesses within complex,
interconnected electricity grids.181 Power plants in all states operate within statewide, regional, or
sometimes nationally interconnected grids, constantly needing to balance not only the
engineering physics of the electricity sector’s energy generation and demand, but also the search
for, and investments in, the most cost-effective and profitable ways to operate.
Generalist judges rarely have an inkling how these sorts of industry-specific and context-specific
factors play out in a dynamic, changing business sector and nation with states that favor different
policies. For this reason, power company advocates emphasized this complex empirical matrix
of regulations, day-to-day plant operations, fuel supply, investments, and current realities of
balancing and pollution trading already in use.
The West Virginia Court’s opinion in several places was responsive to these arguments in favor
of regulation, but which were focused on business effects. The Court carefully distinguished
between the task of setting emissions limitations and the separate issue of how polluters and
states could comply with federally set limits.182
The power companies’ concerns in West Virginia are not unique. In any competitive business
sector, one target of regulation may complain while others may take advantage of regulation or
even be invested in anticipated future business and regulatory environments.183 A court decision
protecting one polluter may fundamentally unsettle others’ investment choices and even basic
business models. Or a decision might inadvertently reward business sector laggards, or even bad
actors. Or, to reach federalism-focused courts, state and local governments –whether arguing for
or against a federal regulatory action--will want to emphasize repercussions they may face and
investments they may have made that could be unsettled by an uninformed antiregulatory court
decision. Because the prevalent environmental law choice is to allow states to do more to protect
the environment, this means states and often their businesses will have sunk costs into their
different, additional choices that create distinctive regulatory environments.184 No court ruling or
underlying regulatory action should, if true to congressional choices, contradict that statutory
design.
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Such empirical reality-based complexities come in several forms that can be described in general
terms. First, both regulations and more individualized regulatory actions such as permitting
usually involve a first-level assessment of harms or risks of harms of the activity in its preregulatory action state. This kind of baselines analysis, which is about the simplest level of
empirical assessment in the environmental law setting, is nonetheless well beyond judicial
competence. What kinds of effects are happening and can be anticipated in particularized
receiving environments? If focused on the polluter, what is the range of capabilities of such
polluters and control technology and practices one finds in the current operating environment?
A second level of empirical analysis both shapes and assesses the regulatory response. What
level of control or risk-reducing measures can and should be required? Or to put it differently,
where can protective regulations reasonably go in light of both statutory “best” benchmarking
variants and new products and practices? Here too, such analysis involves both environmental
effects analysis but also knowledge about the targets of regulation and what they have done or
can do. Even more challenging and beyond judicial ken are predictive expert regulatory
judgments, often by engineers, field scientists, or economists with specialized expertise, all of
whom must assess future trends, actions, and their effects. And often businesses invest in and
develop business models and expertise in light of where they think the law is going, or should
go.
For example, in the CWA, such empirical effects analysis is ubiquitous. A common empirically
focused attribute is found in Section 404 guidelines for dredge or fill activity, categorical
regulations about industries and polluters that in turn are drawn on in facility permitting, and also
water quality-focused portions: all call for assessment of environmental effects, human and
health repercussions, costs and benefits of all kinds, and business and polluter realities and
potential at varied levels of general or individual analysis.185
Moreover, a third type of empirical assessment of regulatory effects requires knowledge of the
web of other statutes, regulations, and practices that shape a sector’s activities and would
interact with any new regulatory choices. Again, this tends to involve knowledge about the
intertwined workings of federal statutes, regulations, implementation and adjudicatory actions,
and important court precedents. Yet another series of layers must look at similar webs or layers
of regional, state, and local laws, plus contractual arrangements and informal practices built on
these legal matrices. Again, no generalist court can have this knowledge. Even a judge who,
perhaps due to past work, knows something about a sector and its regulation will not be current
about business and regulatory realities surrounding later actions.
Cost-benefit analysis also can be part of factually driven counters to antiregulatory proclivities.
Cost-benefit analysis has now been part of the regulatory landscape going back to the 1970s, yet
remains the subject of ongoing debate over its legality, accuracy, efficacy, and even its
morality.186 Such analyses’ actual uses in regulatory actions changes in varied settings and
times, but such analyses provide another powerful empirical hook to check judicial overreach.
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Such analyses tend to document both baseline risks and then provides comparison of costs and
benefits of varied possible regulatory responses, including the final regulatory choice. High
stakes permit proceedings, however, rarely involve systematic preparation of cost-benefit reports
like the Regulatory Impact Analyses accompanying promulgation of most major federal
regulation. They may, however, similarly generate or reflect empirical assessment of costs,
benefits, and other empirical wrinkles raised by that permit.
Since Overton Park, regulators and stakeholders know the importance of creating a supportive
record, even in adjudicatory determinations.187 Advocates can and indeed must draw on such
studies and findings, whether supporting or challenging a factual assertion before an agency or
later reviewing court. Since specious or shoddy agency analyses tend to be spotted and result in
challenges, such analyses are less likely to contain cheap talk or be laden with speculation. And
if an advocate can highlight consistent strains in such analyses over varied administrations, that
creates an even more powerful fact-based check on judicial surmise.
C. Methodological critique of unfounded, skewed, or illogical claims
Another strategy to check the antiregulatory arsenal is more awkward to assert, but remains
essential. Advocates and sympathetic regulators or judges will at times engage in speculation,
anecdotes, or modes of reasoning that flunk any basic sound methodology or logic. In particular,
advocates seem increasingly willing to present one-sided and lightly supported or unsupported
claims about regulatory overreach or egregious regulatory burdens. Or advocates will draw on a
mix of case language or perhaps reported cases to make broader claims about such alleged
regulatory abuses. But conclusory surmise or rhetorical flourishes do not make something true.
Similarly, it is utterly illogical to cite a few reported cases involving regulatory disputes as
establishing anything overall, as does Justice Scalia for the plurality in Rapanos.188 Cases are, by
their nature, brought where issues are in dispute and the challenger, despite deference regimes,
thinks it has a chance of winning and that a regulatory error or abuse has occurred. Litigated
regulatory challenges hence will represent only a tiny percentage of overall regulatory actions or
effects achieved under any statute or program. Unless and until one knows the denominator of
all similar actions, or overall costs and benefits associated with a program, one cannot draw any
conclusion from a few contested actions resulting in judicial opinions. They might be outliers, or
they might indeed be representative. But one reality is quite certain: the small number of
litigated challenges are highly unlikely to reveal anything about the overall benefits or effects of
a regulatory program. If judges do not understand the problem of selection bias, then advocates
need to educate them.
Sometimes the error and counter are simple facts about the overall nature of a regulatory
program, business, or engineering. For example, in Rapanos, during the oral argument, justices’
questions sympathetic to the challenger were based on an assertion that federal Waters
protections simply could not exist if a disputed Water was piped or involved water moving at
187
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times through ditches. Solicitor General Paul Clement, a noted political conservative lawyer and
at that point the George W. Bush Administration’s Solicitor General, responded simply and
powerfully. Such a concept of jurisdictional severance due to any piping or human constructed
ditches or channels could not be right due to realities of waters in their passage through urban
areas. He recounted the Corps’ encountering many sorts of waters’ modifications. He said it is
now at “the point where the difference between that which is a man-made channel and that which
is a natural channel is both difficult to discern and utterly besides the point for this regulatory
scheme.” Relatedly, he said, “some things that are part of the storm drainage system of a city are
actually things that were previous navigable natural waters.”189 This tested bright line to limit the
CWA’s reach was revealed to be specious due to Clements’ greater knowledge of, first, how
waters have been pervasively modified and, second, why regulators as a result viewed such
human modifications as irrelevant to Act jurisdiction.
D. Check unfounded empirical claims
Agencies and stakeholder concerned with unleashed antiregulatory judges could modify how
agencies work to establish a more robust record that would, or should, constrain later judging.
Agencies could explicitly seek particular information from stakeholders, then memorialize what
it reveals. Agencies similarly could target questions to particular claimants making apparently
hyperbolic claims about regulatory excess or burdens, much as legislators after hearings will ask
witnesses to support or amplify their assertions. The recent Supreme Court Prometheus decision
seems to give agencies broader latitude to seek stakeholder information, but then act if not
confronted by contrary responsive information.190
Another move is evident within the Waters’ battles. After SWANCC and Rapanos began to
weaken Waters’ protections, EPA issued public notice that it was gathering the best peer
reviewed science about categories of waters and their functions. The resulting “Connectivity
Report” was also shared when completed, with criticisms welcomed.191 Later, the Obama
Administration drew on this compilation of the best peer reviewed science to justify the
regulatory lines it drew in the Clean Water Rule. Such a massive data or science collecting
exercise serves to reduce administration-to-administration policy vacillation. After all, a later
administration reassessing a policy would have to engage with its own earlier science or data,
especially if relied on in an earlier regulatory action.192 It also similarly constrains reviewing
judges because it is part of the agency’s record, plus it provides actual science and empirical
information that may differ from judicial conjecture or advocates’ contentions.
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Another remedy would rely on a currently disfavored move. Agencies could do more of their
work through formal trial-like on-the-record rulemakings or adjudications. In such settings,
everyone—the government included—would need to introduce key science and data supporting
regulatory contentions. Of particular value, cross examination of witnesses testifying under oath
would provide a further crucible to test and perhaps reveal specious contentions.
A more oblique strategy is for regulatory disputants to push hard against standing to raise
disputes in court unless claims of hardship are documented in sworn affidavits. Criminal perjury
sanctions remain a deterrent to exaggeration and dissembling.
E. Major questions counters
The major questions move or canon—now often called a doctrine—is an interpretive skew that,
by its nature, cuts against any agency assertion of new power that is significant. In its recent
strengthening and recasting, especially in the 2022 West Virginia case, it has gone from a rarely
utilized lens rooted in careful documentation of legislative signals about regulatory power to
general hostility to strong regulation.193 Early cases that began to craft this new doctrine or
canon looked for major agency policy shifts, shifts that were hard to anticipate, and especially
moves into areas where the underlying statute or perhaps statutes made the agency’s new power
assertion suspect.194
In its newest form, emergent since around 2020 on the Supreme Court and wielded by the
antiregulatory majority six, it is mostly about judicial suspicion or hostility to agency powers.
Even agencies working in the sweet spot of their turf, or with express past Supreme Court
approval of their power, have been met with major questions attacks and power rejections. It
may, concededly, now be operating as a cover for judicial rejection of policies the judges dislike.
Nonetheless, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts are unfettered by countervailing
statutory choices and evidence, regulatory track records, and judicial precedents; they may serve
to weaken reliance on this emergent “power canon.”195
The major questions doctrine is problematic due to the discretionary judicial power it involves,
but several countervailing moves might nonetheless possibly check major questions abuse. First,
amassing statutory signals of all sorts that support the regulatory power asserted is critical. This
means countering microtextual isolating interpretative and advocacy frames. Advocates
supporting the regulatory power must provide text-based analysis that weaves support from all
contextual, definitional, operational, and structural signals possible.196
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Second, a strain in Supreme Court precedents has historically recognized that broad power to
address new circumstances can be conferred with broad language. As then Judge (now Justice)
Brett Kavanaugh wrote in 2016, “courts should still defer to agencies in cases involving statutes
using broad and open-ended terms like ‘reasonable,’ ‘appropriate,’ ‘feasible,’ or
‘practicable.’”197 The recent OSHA COVID-19 vaccine decision concededly cuts against this
line of cases, finding the breadth of the claimed power under broad language a reason to reject
OSHA’s action.198 Relatedly, major questions frames often rest, at their heart, on claims of
massive regulatory effects. But if the statute, by its very nature, has broad national effects, that
should counter such a move. So, in the WOTUS setting, the Court’s correct earlier
characterizations of the CWA as a massive piece of antipollution legislation should serve to
counteract breadth of impacts as a rationale for judicial shrinking of a statute.199 Relatedly,
claims of overreach or massive effects should, in the regulatory setting, be somewhere reflected
in record proof. And if such record support is absent, that absence should be the focus on
argument about applications of the major questions doctrine due to claimed major or disruptive
effects.
Lastly, since the major questions move can turn on the novel use of a particular regulatory tool,
or reaching of new targets, those supporting regulation will need to frame ways the action is
consistent with longstanding views of regulatory power or history. Not all new risks mean no
power; agencies are often empowered to address new risks, but through the procedural vetting of
rulemaking. If the agency has, over the years, identified new sources of risk and then acted, or
developed different and more effective regulatory tools, yet another new regulatory assertion
looks less like disruption and more like continuity. And, relatedly, pervasive statutory choices to
set regulatory strictures based on the “best” of some comparator by their very nature should
move regulation into new and more stringent directions. Finding all novel and stringent
regulatory actions suspect would often be illogical and counter to what Congress expressly chose
in “best”-based benchmarking analysis.

Conclusion
The new antiregulatory arsenal is powerful, as evident in CWA Waters’ battles and also as a
series of moves partly constructed from past Waters’ advocacy and decisions. This arsenal is
now a pervasively important factor in devising, attacking, and defending regulatory policies. It
is hard to avoid, especially due to ways the antiregulatory arsenal often is wielded with disregard
of statutory choices, record evidence, and roles and procedures Congress devises within each
statute. Nonetheless, close attention to the web or lattice-like set of statutory text signals,
regulatory records, and roles allocated and preserved by Congress, might serve to check its
aggressive use. But the Supreme Court is so powerful not because it is necessarily right, but

197

Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153 (2016) (book review of
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
198
See NFIB, supra note #.
199
See supra note [around 149] (quoting Supreme Court opinions about the comprehensive nature of the CWA)..

41

because it is last.200 It can in effect rewrite statutes or weaken regulators’ powers and, in a time
of political gridlock, thereby gut protective laws with enduring weakening effects. And the more
it creates new antiregulatory moves and frames, the more advocates will build on that law and
construct new regimes hostile to the administrative state.
The key facets of the antiregulatory arsenal are, in effect, a near opposite of the longstanding
reliance on Chevron deference.201 Instead of agencies presumptively acting in realms of
discretion where they will receive deference from courts, the reviewing climate and
presumptions are becoming decidedly unsympathetic, undeferential, and often overtly hostile to
agencies doing the work required of them by Congress. The antiregulatory arsenal may only be
a judicial creation, but despite its lack of democratic provenance, it remains a powerful weapon
empowering judges and those opposed to regulation to weaken the implemented reality of this
nation’s environmental laws.
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